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Abstract. Some personal recollections on the introduction of ‘abstract
proof systems’ as a framework for formulating syntax-independent, gen-
eral results about rule derivability and admissibility. With a particular
eye on the inspiration I owe to Roel de Vrijer: the analogy with abstract
rewriting systems.
For Roel de Vrijer with my best wishes
on the occasion of his 60th birthday
1 Introduction
As a first aim1 in my Ph.D. project as AIO at the VU-Amsterdam, Jan Willem
Klop suggested to me to investigate the proof-theoretic relationships between
three kinds of proof systems for recursive type equivalence: a Hilbert-style proof
system AC by Amadio and Cardelli (1993), a coinductively motivated proof
system BH by Brandt and Henglein (1998), and a proof system AK by Ariola and
Klop (1995) for consistency-checking with respect to recursive type equivalence.
While originally formulated as a sequent-style calculus, the system of Brandt
and Henglein has a straightforward reformulation in natural-deduction style.
The system of Ariola and Klop can be formulated as a tableau system.
The easiest kind of relationship turned out to hold between the Brandt–
Henglein and Ariola–Klop systems: proofs in BH are, basically, mirror-images
of ‘consistency unfoldings’ (successful finite consistency-checks, comparable to
tableaux proofs) in AK.2 The proof-theoretic relationships of both systems with
the Amadio–Cardelli system, however, are considerably less straightforward. Al-
though also in this case I found proof-transformations in both directions fairly
soon, these transformations were quite complicated, and at least in part had
the flavour of ad hoc solutions. The situation was theoretically unsatisfying in-
sofar as a frequently encountered situation, at the time of constructing these
proof-transformations, was the following. While having shown that a particular
1 It turned out that work at this ‘first aim’ eventually developed into my thesis [4].
2 Jan Willem Klop had observed this mirroring property in examples before, and
pointed me to this phenomenon.
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2 Clemens Grabmayer
rule R of a proof system S1 can always be eliminated from a derivation in an
extension S ′2 of another system S2 by an effective procedure, I was not sure at
all whether applying such an elimination-procedure was in fact essential. Per-
haps instances of R could always be modelled by derivations in S ′2, and I only
had failed to find some very easy demonstration of this fact. In other words, by
having only shown ‘admissibility’ of R in S ′2, I had not excluded the possibility
that R was actually ‘derivable’ in S ′2.
For this reason I got interested in the relationship between, on the one hand,
the notions of rule derivability and rule admissibility, and on the other hand,
the precise manner of how rules can be eliminated from derivations: either by
‘mimicking’ derivations or by elimination procedures. The notions of derivability
and admissibility of inference rules date back at least to Kleene [7] (1952) and
Lorenzen [8] (1955), and have since then been used for the analysis of concrete
proof calculi, and, this predominantly concerns rule admissibility, of what kinds
of inferences a particular semantically given logic admits3. Notwithstanding the
familiarity of the concepts of rule derivability and admissibility, the impression
I got from the literature was that these notions are usually defined only for
concrete proof systems, and not in an abstract way. Furthermore, I did not find
definitions that applied to natural-deduction style systems directly (definitions
which I could immediately have applied for the Brandt–Henglein system BH), nor
a presentation that explains the general practical relevance of rule derivability
and admissibility for interpretational proof theory, and that is, for ‘syntactical
translations of one formal theory into the other’ [11].
However, I came across definitions of rule derivability and admissibility in the
book [6, p.70] of Hindley and Seldin, definitions that I found appealing because
they are based on an abstract notion of proof system (‘formal system’). While
these definitions only pertain to Hilbert-style proof systems, and while only basic
properties are stated for rule derivability and admissibility in [6], two lemmas
there (Lemma 6.14 and Lemma 6.15) stimulated me to think about definitions
for natural-deduction style systems, and about how the mentioned lemmas could
be extended.
In autumn 2002 I picked up again on my earlier triggered interest in rule
derivability and admissibility, trying to investigate, in an abstract framework
close to the one chosen by Hindley and Seldin, the relationship between deriv-
ability and admissibility of rules and the ways how rules can be eliminated from
derivations. Having gathered a number of, elementary, results about derivability
and admissibility in natural-deduction style proof systems, I gave two talks on
this topic in the regular TCS-seminar of our theory group at the VU on Fri-
day afternoons (January 24, and February 7, 2003). While finding my results
interesting, I recall that Roel de Vrijer reacted strongly against the concrete
formulation of rules as extensional ‘rule descriptions’ that I employed.
3 An impressive body of work concerning this question is the study of admissible rules
in intuitionistic propositional logic (IPC) by, to mention only a few names, Friedman,
Rasiowa, Harrop, Rybakov, Visser, de Jongh, Ghilardi, and Iemhoff.
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Overview. In Section 2 Roel’s4 remarks about two ‘naive’ abstract notions of
inference rule are explained, which had highlighted to me significant problems of
those notions. Section 3 is concerned with the concept of ‘abstract rewriting sys-
tem’ in the theory of rewriting, which Roel suggested me to look at. In Section 4
the definition of ‘abstract pure Hilbert system’ (APHS) is given and explained,
which I formulated as a direct consequence of Roel’s remarks. In Section 5 deriv-
ability and admissibility of rules in APHSs are defined, and some results about
these notions are stated. In Section 6 the idea of the notion of rules in ‘abstract
natural-deduction systems’ is outlined. Finally in Section 7 a short summary is
given, and an idea for further research is mentioned.
2 What is an inference rule, formally?
For this section heading I borrowed from the title ‘What is an inference rule? ’ of
the article [2] by Fagin, Halpern, and Vardi. There, the investigation concentrates
on the question of what kinds of inferences semantically defined logics give rise
to, and how these inferences can be classified even with little specific knowledge
about the underlying semantics. Here, however, the focus is on the ways how rules
are formulated operationally, and how abstract rule definitions can be obtained.
Inference rules in logical calculi are defined in a variety of ways. Here are just
a few examples:
A→ B A
MP
B
[A]u
D1
B →I, u
A→ B
A[x := t], Γ ⇒ ∆
L∃∃xA, Γ ⇒ ∆
p1
a−→ p2
L+
p1 + q
a−→ p2
τ1 = τ [α := τ1] τ2 = τ [α := τ2]
UFP
τ1 = τ2
The rules in the first row are taken from proof calculi for, in any case, classical
predicate logic: modus ponens in a Hilbert-system, the →-introduction rule in
a natural-deduction system, and the left-∃-introduction rule in a sequent-style
Gentzen system. The rule L+ in the second row is taken from a transition system
specification (TSS) of a process algebra containing alternative composition +,
and UFP is the unique-fixed-point rule in the Amadio–Cardelli system AC for
recursive type equivalence.
As in the case of the examples above, rules in logical formalisms are usu-
ally defined as schemes using a meta-language of the formula language of the
theory to be formalised such that the instances can be obtained by meta-level
substitution. In the easiest case of a Hilbert-style system (that is ‘pure’, see
Section 4) a rule R is usually represented by a scheme expression of the form
4 I hope to stay true to the spirit of this liber amicorum by switching to using only
Roel de Vrijer’s first name from now on.
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A1, . . . , An/A that consists of premise expressions A1, . . . , An, and a conclu-
sion expression A, where A1, . . . , An, A are expressions in an extension of the
formula language of the theory T to be formalised with, for example, meta-
variables for formulas and terms in T , and notation for object-language substi-
tution in T . The instances of R are then defined to be the inferences of the form
(σ¯(A1))
∗, . . . , (σ¯(An))∗/(σ¯(σ))∗ where σ is a substitution that assigns formulas
and terms of T to meta-variables of according sort, σ¯ is a homomorphic exten-
sion of σ to formula expressions including meta-variables, and where (·)∗ is an
operation that evaluates formula expressions containing substitution notation
over the formula language of T .
A precise formal introduction of an abstract notion of rule that takes the
syntactic view on rule definition seriously (along considerations just sketched)
seems to call for adopting concepts like the LF logical framework [5]. However,
this was not the path on which I proceeded in work for my thesis. Then I decided
to leave the syntactic view on rule definition out of consideration, and concen-
trate instead on abstract notions of inference rule that do not require syntactic
restrictions to be imposed on the formula language.
An abstract definition of rule is given by Hindley and Seldin in [6] in the form
of ‘rule descriptions’ (called ‘rules’ in [6]): partial functions that map sequences
of premise formulas to a single conclusion formula.
Definition 1. Let Fo be a set, and n ∈ N. A rule description for an n-premise
rule in a pure Hilbert system with set Fo of formulas is a partial function Φ :
(Fo)n ⇀ Fo. A rule description Φ over Fo describes the n-premise rule RΦ on
Fo whose instances are defined, for all A1, . . . , An, A ∈ Fo, by:
A1 . . . An
A
is an instance of RΦ ⇐⇒ Φ(A1, . . . , An) = A .
In the first of my earlier mentioned talks in 2003, I used rule descriptions ac-
cording to this definition, and even generalisations for describing rules in natural-
deduction systems, to formulate results on rule derivability and admissibility.
During my presentation Roel immediately noticed, and acutely remarked, the
obvious drawback of rule descriptions according to Definition 1: they are not
able to describe rules that allow more than one conclusion to be inferred from a
given sequence of premises. Rules such as for example:
A ∨IR
A ∨B
∀xA ∀E
A[x := t]
the ∨-introduction rule, and the ∀-elimination rule in natural-deduction systems
for classical or intuitionistic logic.
Now it is an easy remedy to let rule descriptions for n-premise rules, in the
case of pure Hilbert systems, be defined as functions Φ : (Fo)n → P(Fo), and
stipulate that such a rule description Φ defines the rule RΦ with the property that
A1, . . . , An/A is an instance of RΦ if and only if A ∈ Φ(A1, . . . , An). While this is
the change I carried out for my second talk, it is perhaps more natural to drop the
functional aspect in the formalisation of rule descriptions altogether, and view
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rules as relations between premise formulas and a conclusion formula. Troelstra
and Schwichtenberg have chosen such a formulation in [11] for the definition
below of rules in ‘LR-systems’: systems with ‘local rules’ that correspond to pure
Hilbert systems (for the latter see the explanation at the start of Section 4).
Definition 2. Let Fo be a set, and n ∈ N. An n-premise LR-system rule on
(formulas of) Fo is a set of sequences 〈A1, . . . , An, A〉 in Fo of length n + 1.
Elements 〈A1, . . . , An, A〉 of such a rule are called instances and usually written
as A1, . . . , An/A.
While having carried out a change in the definition of rules with the effect
of Definition 2, I vividly remember that Roel had a further objection5 to the
changed definition: It is conceivable that a concrete syntactic definition of a rule
allows two or more instances with the same sequence of premises and the same
conclusion. There may be reasons to preserve the existence of such extensionally,
but not intensionally, equivalent instances of rules.
A possible example is the following formulation of an ∧-elimination rule:
A1 ∧A2 ∧E (i ∈ {1, 2})
Ai
for a proof system for propositional or predicate logic. This rule has two inten-
sionally different instances:
(x = 0) ∧ (x = 0) ∧E
x = 0
(x = 0) ∧ (x = 0) ∧E
x = 0
whereas an LR-rule according to Definition 2 could only contain a single instance
of the form 〈x = 0, x = 0, x = 0〉.
However, it has to be remarked that the rule ∧E is usually split into the
two parts ∧EL and ∧ER that as their instances have the instances of ∧E with i
chosen as 1 or 2, respectively. Furthermore, it seems to me that logicians usually
take care to avoid rules that exhibit a behaviour similar as the ∧-elimination
rule above. At least I am presently unaware of a comparable example from ‘real-
life’ proof-theory. Being interested to hear from others, I formulate the following
question.
Question 3. Do there exist generally accepted proof calculi that contain rules
with instances that are extensionally, but not intensionally, equivalent?
I think that researchers in proof theory working on ‘deep inference’ calculi,
in which rules are allowed to manipulate the syntactic structure of expressions
not only at their outer symbols but also inside of contexts (therefore these proof
systems possess a TRS-like feature), could provide an answer quickly.
Roel’s second objection seemed to call for an entirely different framework for
abstract rule definitions. I took his suggestion to heart to compare the situation
with the definition of ‘abstract rewriting systems’, which had proved to be very
useful in the theory of rewriting.
5 As far as I remember, this must have been in a discussion days after my second talk.
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3 Abstract rewriting systems
Rewriting theory knows many kinds of rewriting systems such as the λ-calculus,
term rewriting systems (TRSs), combinatory reduction systems (CRSs), higher-
order rewriting systems (HRSs), graph rewriting systems, and more. In addition
to the development of theory that is specific to each kind of rewriting system,
it turned out to be very useful to develop also an abstract rewriting theory, in
which the concrete form or structure of objects in a particular rewriting system
is not taken into account. It turns out that even in a fully abstract framework
interesting statements can be formulated, for example, about how properties of
the reflexive-transitive closure→∗ of a rewrite relation→ follow from properties
of →, or from properties of the set of rewrite steps that induces →.
Among the first concepts in abstract rewriting theory were the results for
‘replacements systems’ by Staples (1975), and for ‘abstract reduction systems’
by Klop (1980). In their most simple formulation, abstract reduction systems
[10] are defined as follows.
Definition 4. An abstract reduction system is a structure 〈A,→〉 consisting of
a set A with a binary reduction relation → on A.
In a more general definition of ‘abstract rewriting system’ (see also [10]),
this notion denotes a system 〈A, {→α}α∈I〉 consisting of a set and a family of
binary reduction relations on A. However, the results in [10, Ch. 1] bear witness
to the fact that even the simple version of abstract reduction system is a very
fruitful concept that leads to many interesting results, which due to their abstract
character can be applied to rewrite systems in general.
But abstract rewriting systems in the simple form as in Definition 4 have an
evident drawback: they do not allow to distinguish between two different rewrite
steps from an object a to an object b.
Example 5. Consider the TRS T with as single rule f(x) → x and with the
induced rewrite relation→T on the set Ter of terms over the signature Σ = {f}.
In this TRS, the term f(f(a)) contains two redexes, which give rise to the steps:
f(f(a))→ f(a) f(f(a))→ f(a) ,
respectively. But in the extensional description of T as an abstract reduction
system 〈Ter,→T 〉, these steps cannot be distinguished, since both are witnessed
by the same fact: f(f(a)) →T f(a). This phenomenon is called a syntactic
accident (J.J. Le´vy).
Preservation of the identity of rewrite steps under projecting to an abstract
formalism is essential for proving abstract results on e.g. tracing steps under
rewrite sequences, or on residuals of steps under other steps. This calls for an
abstract framework in which ‘steps are first-class citizens’ (van Oostrom), and
where rewrite relations are only secondary notions. Such a framework is that
of ‘abstract rewriting systems’, which date back to Newman [9], and in the
formulation by van Oostrom and Roel de Vrijer [12,10] are defined as follows.
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src tgt
φ tgt(φ)src(φ)
Figure 1: Visualisation as a hypergraph hyperedge of a step φ ∈ Φ in an
abstract rewriting system A = 〈A,Φ, src, tgt〉 with source formula src(φ) ∈ A
and target formula tgt(φ) ∈ A.
Definition 6. An abstract rewriting system (ARS) is a quadruple of the form
A = 〈A,Φ, src, tgt〉 where:
• A and Φ are sets, the set of objects, and the set of steps, of A, respectively;
• src, tgt : Φ→ A are functions, the source and the target function of A.
(See Figure 1 for a visualisation a step in an ARS as a hyperedge for a hyper-
graph.)
Newman [9] attempted6 to show the confluence property of the λI-calculus
by using abstract rewriting theory in systems comparable to abstract rewriting
systems. An example of an important result that is based on abstract rewriting
systems is the theory of ‘abstract residual systems’ [10, Ch. 8], which allows to
give uniform proofs for results in the theory of residuals in orthogonal first-order
and higher-order term rewriting systems (TRSs and HRSs).
I think that it is likely that Roel’s work as a co-author of [12] and his famil-
iarity with abstract rewriting systems have informed his remarks to me about
the problems with abstract definitions of rules explained in the previous section.
4 Abstract pure Hilbert systems
In this section the definition of ‘abstract pure Hilbert system’ will be given,
which I developed starting in [3] and then in my thesis [4] as a reaction to and
a direct consequence of Roel’s remarks as explained in Section 2. Before turning
to that definition, the concept of ‘pure Hilbert system’ needs to be explained.
In a strict interpretation of this concept, a ‘Hilbert system’ is a proof system
for classical, intuitionistic, or minimal predicate (or propositional) logic that
consists of axiom schemes, and of the single rule modus ponens (MP):
A→ B A
MP
B
In a more liberal interpretation, a Hilbert system may contain arbitrary rules ρ
whose instances are of the form:
A1 . . . An ρ
A
(1)
6 It is pointed out in [12, cf. Rem. 6.14, (ii)] that Newman’s attempt actually fails
because for showing confluence of the λI-calculus he uses statements that depend
on abstract rewriting properties which do not hold for the λI-calculus.
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A Hilbert system H (in the liberal sense) is called ‘pure’ if rule applications
within derivations in H do not depend on the presence or absence of assumption
occurrences in the immediate subderivations. More precisely, the following must
hold: Suppose that ρ is a rule in a Hilbert system H. And suppose that, for some
formulas A,A1, . . . , An of H, (1) is an instance of ρ. Furthermore, let D1, . . . ,Dn
be derivations in H (which may contain unproven assumptions) with conclusions
A1, . . . , An, respectively. Then the prooftree D of the form:
D1
A1 . . .
Dn
An ρ
A
is a derivation in H, irrespectively of whether or not assumptions occur in
D1, . . . ,Dn, and how these do actually look like.
Typical examples of pure Hilbert systems are Hilbert systems in the strict
sense for propositional or predicate logic. Examples of non-pure Hilbert systems
are the well-known proof systems for modal logics such as K, T, S4, and S5,
which contain the necessitation rule (NR) with instances of the form:
A
NR2A (2)
The applicability of NR in derivations of these proof systems is restricted to situ-
ations in which the immediate subderivation of the premise does not contain any
unproven assumptions (and hence this premise must be a theorem). Therefore
instances of NR of the form (2) are subject to a side-condition on the absence of
assumptions in the immediate subderivation of the premise, and hence Hilbert
systems including this rule are impure, that is, not pure.
In the stipulation for the property ‘pure’ of Hilbert systems I followed an
analogous stipulation that Avron uses in [1] for ‘Hilbert-type systems for conse-
quence’. There, a nice characterisation of Hilbert systems and natural-deduction
systems among all sequent-style Gentzen systems is given. In Avron’s termi-
nology, pure Hilbert systems as explained above correspond7 to pure, single-
conclusioned Hilbert-type systems for consequence, which formally are sequent-
style systems.
Pure Hilbert systems are among the easiest kinds of proof systems. Therefore
it was natural for me to start with formulating an abstract version of these
systems, before later going on to define abstract versions of systems of natural
deduction. The concept of ‘abstract pure Hilbert system (APHS)’, which will
be defined below, is analogous to abstract rewriting systems in the sense that
steps between objects (here, inference steps between formulas) are central, not
the relations between objects (but these relations are induced by the steps).
However, somewhat different from the definition of ARSs, in which the notion of
a (rewrite) rule does not figure at all, in the concept of an APHS the distinction
between different inference rules is retained. The foremost reason for this was
my wish to let derivations in APHSs closely resemble prooftrees in a usual sense
with rule names displayed next to the derivations’ inferences.
7 This correspondence is made explicit and proved in Appendix E of [3].
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prem(1)(ι) prem(n)(ι)
concl(ι)
1 n
ι
Figure 2: Visualisation as hypergraph hyperedge of an instance ι of an
APHS-rule with arity arity(ι) = n.
As a consequence it is a prerequisite for the definition of APHSs (see Def-
inition 8 below) to introduce first the concept of ‘unnamed APHS-rule’. Here,
the following notation will be used: For all sets X, by Seqsf(X) the set of all
finite-length sequences of elements of X is meant; the empty sequence is denoted
by 〈〉, and n-element sequences in Seqsf(X) are written as 〈x1, . . . , xn〉, where
x1, . . . , xn ∈ X.
Definition 7. Let Fo be a set. An unnamed APHS-rule (an unnamed rule for
an ‘abstract pure Hilbert system’) on (the formulas of) Fo is a triple R =
〈Insts, prem, concl〉 where:
• Insts is a set whose elements are called the instances of R,
• prem : Insts → Seqsf(Fo) and concl : Insts → Fo are the premise function
and the conclusion function of R, respectively.
For all sets Fo, by R(Fo) the class of unnamed APHS-rules on Fo is denoted.
Note that unnamed APHS-rules are allowed to have instances with different
arities. In addition to the functions prem and concl associated with a rule, for an
unnamed APHS-rule R = 〈Insts, prem, concl〉
the function arity : Insts→ N and
the partial functions prem(i) : Insts ⇀ Fo (for all i ∈ N)
are defined as follows: arity assigns to an instance ι of R the number of its
premises, that is, the length of the sequence prem(ι). For all i ∈ N, i ≥ 1,
prem(i)(ι) assigns to an instance ι of R its i-th premise, that is, the i-th formula
Ai in prem(ι) = 〈A1, . . . , Ai, . . . 〉 if it exists; otherwise, prem(i)(ι) is undefined.
Using these definitions, a visualisation of an instance ι ∈ Insts with arity(ι) =
n of an unnamed APHS-rule R = 〈Insts, prem, concl〉 as a hypergraph hyperedge
is given in Figure 2. In a prooftree such an instance can be written as:
prem(1)(ι) . . . prem(n)(ι)
concl(ι)
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While rules for APHSs do not carry names, rules in abstract pure Hilbert
systems as defined below do carry names.
Definition 8. An abstract pure Hilbert system (an APHS) H is a quadruple
〈Fo,Na, nAx, nRu〉 where:
• Fo, Na, nAx and nRu are sets whose elements are called the formulas of H,
the names (for axioms and rules) in H, the named axioms of H, and the
named rules of H, respectively; we demand Fo 6= ∅, i.e. that the formula set
be nonempty;
• nAx ⊆ Fo×Na, i.e. the named axioms of H are tuples with formulas of H
as first, and names in H as second, components;
• nRu ⊆ R(Fo)×Na, i.e. the named rules of H are tuples that have unnamed
APHS-rules on Fo as their first, and names as their second components;
• for the named axioms and the named rules of H the following holds:
(i) names of named axioms in nAx are different from names of named rules,
(ii) different named rules in nRu carry different names (but for an unnamed
APHS-rule R and different names na1, na2 ∈ Na, it is possible that
〈R,na1〉, 〈R,na2〉 ∈ nRu).
This definition of APHSs, which is essentially the formulation in my thesis
[4], is actually a slight reformulation of the notion of ‘abstract Hilbert system
with names for axioms and rules’ (n-AHS) in [3] after discussions with Roel in
my last year as Ph.D. student, when I was writing down my thesis. In [3] an
n-AHS is defined as a quintuple 〈Fo,Ax,Ru,Na, name〉 consisting of a set Fo of
formulas, a set Ax ⊆ Fo of axioms, a set Ru ⊆ R(Fo) of unnamed APHS-rules, a
set Na of names, and a name function name : Ru→ Na. Roel remarked that this
use of a name function on a set of unnamed APHS-rules prevents the possibility
that the same unnamed APHS-rule could occur twice, under different names, in
an APHS. He convinced me that the formalisation should not a priori exclude
systems in which an initially unnamed rule occurs under more than one name.
Let H = 〈Fo,Na, nAx, nRu〉 be an APHS. In prooftrees, an instance ι ∈
InstsR of an unnamed rule R such that 〈R,na〉 ∈ nRu, is written as:
prem(1)(ι) . . . prem(n)(ι)
na
concl(ι)
A derivation in H is defined as a prooftree in the sense of [11]: a tree in which
the nodes are labelled by formulas and in which the edges make part of rule
instances and are not drawn, but are replaced by horizontal lines that represent
rule instances and carry the name of the rule that is applied. Axioms and as-
sumptions appear as top nodes; lower nodes are formed by applications of rules;
the bottommost formula is the conclusion. If D is a derivation in H, then by
assm(D) the set of assumptions of D, and by concl(D) the conclusion of D will
be denoted. Let R be an APHS-rule on the formula set of H. A derivation D in H
is called a mimicking derivation for an instance ι of R if assm(D) ⊆ set(prem(ι))
and concl(D) = concl(ι).
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The (usual, standard) consequence relation `H in an APHS H with formula
set Fo is a binary relation between sets of formulas and formulas of H. For all
formulas A ∈ Fo, and sets Σ ⊆ Fo of formulas, in H, Σ `H A holds if there is a
derivation D in H such that the assumptions of D are contained in Σ, and A is
the conclusion of D. By `H A the statement ∅ `H A is abbreviated. A formula
A is a theorem of an APHS H if `H A holds, that is, if there is a derivation in
H without assumptions that has A as its conclusion.
Let H be an APHS, R an unnamed APHS-rule over the set of formulas of
H, and Rˆ = 〈R,na〉 a named version of R. Then the result of adding Rˆ to the
named rules of H is denoted by H+Rˆ given that it is an APHS.
5 Rule derivability and admissibility in APHSs
In this section the definitions of derivability and admissibility of arbitrary APHS-
rules in an APHS are introduced, based on the stipulations at the end of the pre-
vious section. Furthermore, basic results about these notions are stated, together
with results that I have obtained in [3] and [4].
In the definitions below of rule derivability and admissibility in APHSs the
following notation will be used: for a set X and a sequence σ ∈ Seqsf(X), set(σ)
denotes the set of elements of X that occur in σ.
Let H be an abstract Hilbert system, and let R = 〈Insts, prem, concl〉 an
unnamed APHS-rule over the set of formulas of H. Then R is called derivable in
H if:
for all ι ∈ Insts: set(prem(ι)) `H concl(ι) . (3)
R is called correct for H if:
for all ι ∈ Insts: [ (for all A ∈ set(prem(ι)): `H A) =⇒ `H concl(ι) ] . (4)
And R is stipulated to be admissible in H if every (or equivalent: one) extension
H+Rˆ of H by adding a named version Rˆ of R has the same theorems as H. A
named rule Rˆ = 〈R,na〉 is derivable/correct/admissible in H if the underlying
unnamed rule R is derivable/correct/admissible in H, respectively.
Each of these definitions can be reformulated in terms of ‘mimicking deriva-
tions’. For example, an unnamed APHS-rule R is derivable in an APHS H if and
only if for every instance of R there exists a mimicking derivation in H.
The following proposition gathers some of the most basic properties of rule
derivability, correctness, and admissibility, and of their interrelations. Items (i)–
(iii) of this statement are a reformulation for APHSs of a lemma by Hindley and
Seldin (Lemma 6.14 on p. 70 in [6]). Item (iv) is taken from [3] (see Theorem 3.5
on p. 18–19 there).
Proposition 9. Let H be an APHS, and let R be an unnamed APHS-rule on
the set of formulas of H. Then the following statements hold:
(i) R is admissible in H if and only if R is correct for H.
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(ii) If R is derivable in H, then R is admissible in H. But the converse implica-
tion does not hold in general.
(iii) If R is derivable in H, the R is derivable in every extension of H by adding
new formulas, new axioms, and/or new rules.
(iv) R is derivable in H if and only if R is admissible in every extension of H by
adding new formulas, new axioms, and/or new rules.
Further results that I have obtained in [3] include the following:
1. Let H be an APHS, R an unnamed APHS-rule, and H+Rˆ an extension of
H by adding a named version Rˆ = 〈R,na〉 of R. If R is admissible in H,
then every derivation D in H+Rˆ without assumptions can be replaced by
a mimicking derivation D′ in H (without assumptions). If R is derivable
in H, then every derivation D in H+Rˆ can be replaced by a mimicking
derivation D′ in H, which moreover can be found by stepwise replacements
of Rˆ-instances in D by mimicking derivations in H.
2. Let H1,H2 be APHSs that have the same set of formulas. The following
statements are equivalent with the statement that H1 and H2 have the same
admissible rules: (i) the rules of H1 are admissible in H2, and vice versa,
and (ii) H1 and H2 have the same theorems. Statements equivalent with the
assertion that H1 and H2 have the same derivable rules are: (i)′ the rules of
H1 are derivable in H2, and vice versa, and (ii)′ H1 and H2 induce the same
consequence relation.
3. Let H be an APHS, R an unnamed APHS-rule, and H+Rˆ an extension of
H by adding a named version Rˆ = 〈R,na〉 of R. If R is derivable in H,
then Rˆ-elimination for derivations in H+Rˆ can be performed effectively:
For a given derivation D in H+Rˆ, pick an arbitrary instance of Rˆ in the
derivation and replace it, in the derivation, by a mimicking derivation; carry
out such mimicking steps repeatedly until no further applications of Rˆ are
present, and a derivation D′ in H has been reached. This nondeterministic
procedure is strongly normalising.
Apart from the notions of rule derivability and admissibility defined above
that are based on the standard notion of consequence relation, in [3] two variant
notions are studied that refer to variant consequence relations. For these variant
notions similar results are obtained; their interconnections with each other and
with the standard notions are studied with the result of ‘interrelation prisms’.
6 Abstract natural-deduction systems
In this section the notion of rule in an ‘abstract natural-deduction system’
(ANDS) is only hinted at. For the details I refer to Chapter 4 and Appendix B
of my thesis [4].
Rules in natural-deduction style proof systems typically have a more complex
form than rules in Hilbert systems: An instance ι of a rule in a natural-deduction
system is usually not exclusively determined by a sequence of premises and a
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1 n
1 n
pmassm(1)(ι) pmassm(n)(ι)
prem(1)(ι) prem(n)(ι)
dmassm(ι)
concl(ι)
ι
Figure 3: Visualisation as an hypergraph hyperedge of an instance ι with arity
arity(ι) = n of an ANDS-rule.
conclusion, but its description frequently also involves, per premise, a set of
assumptions that has to be present, and a number of assumptions that may
be, or in fact are, discharged at ι. Instead of assumption formulas, assumptions
in natural-deduction systems are often formalised as formulas with decorating
markers that are used to single out those marked assumptions which are dis-
charged at an instance.
Figure 3 contains an illustration of an instance of an unnamed rule for an
‘abstract natural-deduction system’ as defined in [4]: apart from premise and
conclusion functions, unnamed ANDS-rules also contain functions pmassm and
dmassm that map instances to their sequences of present marked assumptions
per premise, and to their discharged marked assumptions, respectively.
In a sequent-style representation, a typical instance ι of an ANDS-rule, one
with arity(ι) = n as depicted in Figure 3, can be written in the following form:
pmassm(1)(ι)⇒ prem(1)(ι) . . . pmassm(n)(ι)⇒ prem(n)(ι)(⋃n
i=1 pmassm
(i)(ι)
) \ dmassm(ι) ⇒ concl(ι) (5)
For the precise formal definitions of rule derivability and admissibility in ANDSs
some care is needed. The situation is considerably less straightforward than in
APHSs, and I refer to [4] for the details. I want to mention, however, that the
definitions of admissibility and derivability of ANDS-rules in ANDSs can be
obtained in the following way: (i) by considering sequent-style representations
of ANDS-rules with instances of the form (5) as APHS-rules on sequents as
formulas, and by considering sequent-style representations of entire ANDSs as
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APHSs with sequents as their formulas, (ii) by applying the definitions of rule
derivability and admissibility in APHSs to these APHS-rules and APHSs, and
(iii) by transferring the resulting conditions back to ANDSs. That is to say,
rule derivability and admissibility in ANDSs can be defined by applying the
definitions of rule derivability and admissibility in APHSs for APHS-rules on
sequents that represent ANDS-rules with respect to APHSs (with sequents as
formulas) that represent ANDSs.
In my thesis, the definition of rule derivability and admissibility for natural-
deduction systems proved to be useful in the manner indicated in the Section 1.
In essentially all relevant cases of rules R of the Amadio–Cardelli system AC
whose status in BH earlier seemed doubtful to me, I succeeded in proving that
R is admissible, but not derivable in the Brandt–Henglein system BH; and con-
sequently, that instances of R cannot just be simulated in BH by mimicking
derivations, but have to eliminated in an other, typically more complicated, way.
Having earlier obtained elimination procedures for instances of such rules R from
BH-derivations, I at least obtained some certainty that I had not overlooked an
obvious way to mimic R-instances by derivations in BH.
7 Summary, a research idea, and thanks
Summary. By work for my Ph.D. thesis on proof-theoretic interpretations into
each other of proof systems for recursive types I became aware of the general
relevance of rule derivability and admissibility for interpretational proof theory.
Due to the fact that rule derivability and admissibility are usually only defined
for concrete proof systems, and since the definitions of these notions in natural-
deduction style systems had not been clear to me from the outset, I started a
study of general properties of these notions in abstractly viewed proof systems
(both Hilbert and natural-deduction style). Formal definitions of abstract no-
tions of inference rule such as extensional rule descriptions, on which I had based
this study in my early attempts, were criticised by Roel as inadequate and, most
of all, as conceptually unsatisfiable. Stimulated by Roel’s remarks and his sug-
gestion to try to draw inspiration from the concept ‘abstract rewriting system’
in rewriting theory, I formulated the frameworks of APHSs and ANDSs for ab-
stract Hilbert-style and natural-deduction style proof systems. In these systems,
rules are treated as sets of (abstract) inference steps rather than as mere rela-
tions between formulas, thereby keeping some information about how concrete
rules are defined intensionally. In the sequel I used the concepts of APHSs and
ANDSs to state general results about derivability and admissibility of rules in
pure Hilbert systems, and in natural-deduction systems.
A research idea. The frameworks of APHSs and ANDSs are based on abstract
concepts of rules that do not make use (at least not a priori) of special assump-
tions on the formula language. While studying rule derivability and admissibility
in these kinds of abstract proof systems was sufficient for my particular pur-
poses, I think that it would also be fruitful to carry out a similar investigation
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in abstract proof systems that are based on syntactic rule concepts, perhaps
formalised within a ‘logical framework’ such as LF. In particular, it would be
interesting to see what kind of additional results about derivability and admis-
sibility become possible once the syntactic manners in which inference rules are
usually defined is exploited systematically. In the setting of proof systems that
are formalised within a logical framework, an idea for research would be to view
elimination procedures for inference rules as higher-order rewriting systems, and
to try to take advantage of the well-developed theory for higher-order rewriting.
Thanks. I want to conclude by expressing my gratitude to Roel for his critical
remarks about my earlier use of extensional rule descriptions, his reference to
abstract rewriting systems, and the help he gave to me in regular discussions
about the notions of abstract proof systems during my last year as an AIO at
the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam.
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to me the origins of abstract rewriting systems in the work of Newman, and for
his comments about previous versions of this text. My thanks go also to Jan
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